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ANNEX (F)

1. Objective

To assist, in Korea and contiguous areas, UN military operations.

2. Psychological Effects Desired:

- a. Lowered morale of North Korean and Chinese troops and civilians supporting Soviet-led Communism.
- b. Heightened morale of North Korean and Chinese peoples desiring defeat of Soviet-led Communism.
- c. An attitude of violent antagonism to Soviet-led Communism in the minds of North Korean and Chinese peoples.
- d. Hopelessness in the minds of North Korean and Chinese Communist leaders, both military and civilian, regarding the military situation.
- e. Explosive three-way distrust between Pyongyang, Peking, and Moscow.
- f. General confusion in the minds of North Korean and Chinese Communist leaders.

3. Points for Propaganda Emphasis

- a. Eventual failure of Soviet-led Communism in Asia because of its inherent unacceptability to Asian peoples.
- b. Military successes of UN forces contrasted with military failure on the part of North Korean and Chinese Communist armies.
- c. Hopelessness of the North Korean and Communist Chinese moral-political-economic-military situation as contrasted with the strong moral-political-economic-military position of the free nations acting confidently in mutual support.
- d. Physical and spiritual hardships imposed upon North Korean and Chinese peoples by Soviet-directed Communism and falsity of promises of a better life under Soviet-led Communism.
- e. North Korean and Communist Chinese ineptness of military leadership, inferiority of weapons, marked insufficiencies of military equipment

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and supplies, and costly war losses in men and equipment, contrasted with UN military aptitude and plenty.

- f. Incipient dissension, contentious division, or actual political or military cleavage between Pyongyang and Peking, Peking and Moscow, or Moscow and Pyongyang.
- g. Political, economic, and military gullibility of North Korean and Chinese leaders; lack of veracity of Communist political announcements, economic reports, and military communiques; mismanagement of North Korean and Communist China communications and failure of the flow of supplies; general and specific economic confusion in North Korea and Communist China; inefficiency of internal administration of North Korea and Communist China; low intellect and wavering purpose of North Korean and Communist China civil officialdom; political intrigue, for personal gain or advancement, of high North Korean and Chinese Communist leaders; rising popular resistance in North Korea and Communist China to Soviet-led Communism, appearing in such acts as local sabotage, boycotts, increased guerrilla activity, etc.